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In this paper, I will present and advocate a view about what we are 
doing when we attribute delusion, namely, say that someone is 
delusional. It is an “expressivist” view, roughly analogous to 
expressivism in meta-ethics. Just as meta-ethical expressivism 
accounts for certain key features of moral discourse, so does this 
expressivism account for certain key features of delusion attribution. 
And just as meta-ethical expressivism undermines factualism about 
moral properties, so does this expressivism, if correct, show that 
certain attempts to objectively define delusion are misguided. I 
proceed as follows. I start by examining different attempts at defining 
delusion, separating broadly psychiatric attempts from epistemic 
ones. I then present a change of approach, according to which we 
question whether the term “delusion” is in the business of (merely) 
describing reality. I then support this proposal, first, by borrowing 
standard lines of argument from meta-ethics (including ontological 
reluctance, intrinsic motivation, and deep disagreement) but also, by 
inference to the best explanation of some the features we see when we 
try to theorise about delusion (namely that it is hard to define, and 
that our delusion attributions are elicited by a plurality of norms). 
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1. Defining Delusion 
 
There is an ambiguity in the question “What is delusion?” In particular, is 
this question paradigmatic or parametric? By this I mean: is the question 
asking us to provide paradigmatic examples of delusion? In other words, 
is it asking us to point to or describe the sorts of things that get called 
delusions? Or is it asking us to provide parameters that strictly categorize 
any phenomena, even hypothetical phenomena, as delusional or not? The 
standard way to think of such parameters is in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, free from counter-examples. These can then function 
as a sorting algorithm. You input the target phenomenon and it tells you 
whether it is a delusion or not. This is what is often meant by a definition, 
at least in philosophy. 
  
The paradigmatic answer is often thought to be unsatisfying since it invites 
the follow-up question: “Yes, but why are these paradigmatic instances of 
delusions?” This invites attempts to define delusion, which I will broadly 
present now. I will present psychiatric approaches, then epistemic 
approaches, and then motivate a total change of tactic. 
 
1.1. Psychiatric Approaches 
 
The prominent psychiatrist Tony David speaks of the “impossibility of 
defining delusions” (1999) in a paper of that title: 
 
Most attempted definitions begin with “false belief”, and this 
is swiftly amended to an unfounded belief to counter the 
circumstance where a person’s belief turns out to be true. Then 
caveats accumulate concerning the person’s culture and 
whether the beliefs are shared. Religious beliefs begin to cause 
problems here and religious delusions begin to create major 
conflicts […]. The beleaguered psychopathologist then falls 
back on the “quality” of the belief - the strength of the 
conviction in the face of contradictory evidence, the 
“incorrigibility”, the personal commitment, etc. Here, the 
irrationality seen in “normal” reasoning undermines the 
specificity of these characteristics for delusions […] as does 
the variable conviction and fluctuating insight seen in patients 
with chronic psychoses who everyone agrees are deluded […]. 
Finally we have the add-ons: the distress caused by the belief, 
its preoccupying quality, and its maladaptiveness generally, 
again, sometimes equally applicable to other beliefs held by 
non-psychotic fanatics of one sort or another. In the end we are 
left with a shambles. (David 1999, 17-18)  
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This lament (and it surely is a lament with strong negatively laden terms 
like “beleaguered” and “shambles”) is revealing of two interesting things. 
First, when theorists talk of “defining” delusion, they seem to want a clear 
presentation of necessary and sufficient conditions. This is seen by the fact 
that counter-examples are seen to be damaging to such a definition. What 
provide counter-examples to any definition (e.g. the DSM definition) are 
cases where the delusional status (and indeed pathological status) has 
already been recognised. That’s why they are counter-examples! This 
means, though, that any definition isn’t guiding our judgements about 
delusional status. We’ve already made these judgements intuitively.  
 
The second thing is that David seems to be assuming that delusions must, 
as a matter of conceptual necessity, be pathological. This can be seen from 
the fact that he takes irrationality in the “normal”, healthy, population to 
undermine a definition that might be based only on irrationality, rather than 
allowing that delusions in healthy people might not be a contradiction in 
terms.  
 
Contrast this with, for example, what philosopher Kengo Miyazono (2015) 
writes in a paper explaining what it is that makes some delusions 
pathological: “I do not assume that all delusional beliefs are pathological 
[…] I only discuss typical delusional beliefs that are pathological” 
(Miyazono 2015, 561, fn.1). Similarly, Valentina Petrolini (2017), also a 
philosopher, presents a fascinating account of what makes delusions 
pathological in terms of dysfunctional relevance detection. But, like 
Miyazono, there is no assumption that delusions must by definition be 
pathological, only that, when they are, and the canonical ones are, this 
explains why. And again, in a similar vein, Lancellotta and Bortolotti (this 
issue) examine the implications that different accounts (different versions 
of two-factor accounts, to be precise) of the Capgras delusion have for 
whether the delusion should be counted as pathological. This enterprise 
would only make sense on the (in my view very sensible) assumption that 
delusions aren’t pathological by definition. 
 
This contrast reveals two ways of approaching delusion. First, you can 
think of it as a diagnostically important psychiatric concept, a Jaspers-style 
“marker of madness”, in light of which non-pathological delusion is indeed 
a contradiction. Second, and alternatively, you can think of it as a concept 
that has to be carefully defined in terms of epistemology, or, at least, not 
centrally as a medical phenomenon, but as a (more abstract, perhaps) 
mental state that is subject to various normative evaluations, most notably, 




One can easily understand why clinicians will tend to see delusions as 
pathological by conceptual necessity: delusions that are (deemed) 
pathological are the ones that are likely to come to their attention. But 
suppose that, instead of thinking of delusion as necessarily pathological, 
we thought of the relationship between mental illness and delusion as less 
direct. On such a view, the sorts of things that we call delusions tend to be 
pathological, but they aren’t by conceptual necessity. Indeed, even if it 
were in practice impossible to have a delusion that wasn’t pathological, it 
wouldn’t be a contradiction in terms. For Miyazono (2015), for example, 
delusions might well be caused by, and indicative of, pathology (construed 
as harmful dysfunction (Wakefield 1992)), but aren’t conceptually tied to 
this. We will return to the relationship between delusion and pathology 
later. 
 
1.2. Epistemic Approaches 
 
Whatever we take delusion to be, one thing that seems fairly obvious is 
that they (and the subjects who have them) are breaking norms, and, in 
particular, epistemic norms. As David puts it, at a minimum, they seem, 
most centrally, to be “unfounded belief”. Echoing this, Max Coltheart 
(2007, 1043) writes: “couldn’t a true belief be a delusion, as long as the 
believer had no good reason for holding the belief?” Indeed, the DSM 5 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013) has picked up on this by 
dropping the falsehood requirement.1 
 
This way of putting things introduces the notion of reasons, and epistemic 
rationality.2 Unfounded beliefs are epistemically irrational, but epistemic 
rationality is a broader notion that encompasses, but is not exhausted by, 
evidentiary grounding (i.e. the “founding” of belief). Epistemic rationality 
is to be contrasted with practical rationality. Rationality in general can be 
thought of in terms of the attainment of certain aims. Practically rational 
 
1 Many thanks to Valentina Petrolini for pointing this out to me. 
2 In the context of a different debate, surrounding the question of whether delusions count 
as beliefs, Lisa Bortolotti (2009) distinguishes three kinds of rationality: procedural, 
epistemic, and agential rationality. Procedural rationality is about how a belief relates to 
other mental states, epistemic rationality about how it relates to evidence, and agential 
rationality about how it relates to action. The assessed claim is that these forms of 
irrationality, present in delusions, prevent delusions from being counted as beliefs. 
Bortolotti convincingly argues that these forms of irrationality are present in non-delusional 
beliefs too, and so if we were to deny belief-status for delusions, we’d have to do it for 
many other things that we count as beliefs. Note that this pertains to belief-status, rather 
than delusion-status. But since Bortolotti is keen to show that these forms of irrationality 
are present in non-delusional belief, she will agree with me that they can’t function as fully 
definitive markers of delusion. 
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action is action that maximizes our chances of fulfilling our own aims 
(“motives”, “desires”). So an irrational action is an action that does a bad 
job of fulfilling these. For example, a reluctant addict’s behaviour (e.g. 
someone who wants to stop smoking but can’t) is perhaps a prime example 
of practical irrationality. So what is an epistemically rational belief? 
Whether we can aim at anything while believing is controversial (Williams 
1970), however, the idea that belief itself aims at truth is seen by many as 
highly plausible (Velleman 2000; Wedgewood 2002). There are many 
characterisations of epistemic rationality, but a simple one that suits our 
purposes is belief-formation that has maximized its chances of achieving 
its goal, namely, truth. So, what is actually involved in epistemic 
rationality, such that it is (as we say) truth-conducive? 
 
A combination of things might count. As we’ve said, using adequate 
evidence in the formation of a belief, giving due weight to evidence that 
might cause you to revise your belief, not allowing motivational influences 
to derail your tracking of the truth (i.e. wishful thinking), having a certain 
degree of consistency among the beliefs that you hold, not 
compartmentalising information that is inconsistent, and so on. Here is the 
core question we come to: Can delusion be defined in terms of epistemic 
irrationality, thus construed? 
 
1.2.1. Not Sufficient: Non-Delusional Irrationality 
 
There are two issues that it is important to separate. One is a relatively 
minor issue: where do we draw the line? I call this issue “relatively minor”, 
because it allows that irrationality could in principle do the job, but there’s 
a challenge about where we place the threshold. Of course, one might think 
that a valuable revision to our practices is to think of delusion as being on 
a gradation, rather than something that is binary. On such a view, people 
aren’t simply delusional or not, but are rather more or less delusional. The 
threshold at which someone tips from non-delusional irrationality to 
delusional levels of irrationality is arbitrary, or at best drawn on the basis 
of non-epistemic considerations, such as how well the person “functions”, 
whether the delusion causes suffering, whether other symptoms are 
present, and so on. This is perhaps an attractive position. 
 
The more damaging issue undermines even this more relaxed gradualism. 
What the gradualism is minimally committed to is some kind of 
correlation between irrationality and this gradual “delusionality”. In other 
words, the more irrational you are, the more delusional you are. The worry 
is that this correlation may not hold. Stated plainly, Person A might be 




Consider, for example (from Nozick 1993, cited in Murphy 2012), a 
mother whose son has been convicted of murder. We can understand that 
she will be highly resistant to evidence that suggests that he is guilty. We 
will not, however (I would suggest) be tempted to call her delusional. 
(rather, this would be classified more naturally as self-deception (see Mele 
2006)) People in these situations are believing in ways that are 
epistemically deeply irrational (they are far from being truth-conducive), 
but they are intuitively not delusional. Why is this? I would suggest that it 
is because we can recognise their motivations, and we can recognise the 
influences that these can have on belief-formation and maintenance. This 
means that we find their epistemic irrationality unsurprising and 
understandable. This is just part and parcel of our folk models of other 
human beings. We might even recognise (implicitly or explicitly) that in 
similar circumstances we would do similarly. We might even be repulsed 
by a mother who calmly and dispassionately evaluated evidence pertaining 
to her son’s guilt accurately. We model other human beings (and ourselves) 
as understandably biased and emotional creatures. Of course, there is an 
extreme level of evidence-resistance at which a threshold could be crossed 
and we might be tempted to call the mother in our example delusional. But, 
crucially, the threshold is significantly higher as a result of our folk 
understanding of motivational influences on belief. This shows that degree 
of epistemic rationality alone cannot determine delusional status. 
 
This, I would suggest, points towards a major change of approach. 
However, before moving on to this new approach, let’s look at the other 
reason why delusion cannot be defined in terms of epistemic rationality, 
namely, that it might not even be necessary, let alone sufficient. 
 
1.2.2. Not Necessary: Rational Delusion? 
 
Might there be cases of delusion that don’t involve any irrationality in the 
sense we have just sketched? There are two very different kinds of grounds 
one might have for claiming this. One is on the basis of already existing 
(and in principle empirically testable) theories about how certain cases of 
delusion come about. The other is a conceptual argument that can be 
supported with thought experiments.  
  
With advancements in cognitive neuropsychiatry we have moved beyond 
the observable behaviour of delusional individuals to some understanding 
of what might underpin the formation of these delusions. In particular, 
there has been increasing support for the view that these delusions are in 
fact formed on the basis of some kind of anomaly at the level of 
experiential input. To put it in more intuitive terms, if you or I were to 
experience what these patients experience, then we too would form the 
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delusions that they form. As Brendan Maher presciently put it, at a time 
before neuropsychological theories of delusions were available, “The 
delusional belief is not being held “in the face of evidence strong enough 
to destroy it”, but is being held because evidence is strong enough to 
support it” (Maher 1974, 99). The point is that we can think of (at least 
some) delusions as arising from correct use of very bizarre input (what 
Maher calls “evidence”), instead of from a misuse of normal input. 
 
As we are about to see, most philosophers and neuropsychologists in the 
field agree that many paradigm cases of delusion have at least some 
experiential grounds. The main source of contention is whether this 
experiential anomaly is strong enough (carries enough epistemic weight) 
to explain why the delusion is maintained for so long, or whether we need 
to postulate a bias of some kind (Langdon and Colheart 2000, for example, 
think that we do). In the latter case, the delusional patient would be charged 
with epistemic irrationality. 
 
However, whether or not there actually are biases at work is an empirical 
question, and our aim is to ascertain, regardless of whether certain real-
world delusional patients are epistemically irrational or not, whether, if 
there were people who believed these bizarre things on the basis of fully 
adequate private grounds, and hence are plausibly epistemically rational 
(or at least as epistemically rational as “normal” people), we would still 
rightly consider them to be delusional. To put it another way, if Maher’s 
theory happened to be correct (regardless of whether it actually is or not) 
would these patients still count as delusional?  
 
Jennifer Radden (2010) calls these, rather aptly, “perceptual delusions”. 
Her view is that, as “reasonable inferences from misleading perceptual 
experiences, “perceptual delusions” are not epistemic lapses of the sort by 
which delusional states are identified” (2010, 28, emphasis added). This 
amounts to us retrospectively revising our delusion attributions in light of 
a stipulation that delusions are tied to epistemic irrationality, and the 
discovery that a significant proportion of delusional states aren’t after all 
irrational in the requisite way. In other words, it may turn out that some 
paradigmatic cases of delusion aren’t delusional after all, since they aren’t 
really irrational in the required way. This position is coherent, but such an 
overarching revision of what we deem to be a delusion needs to be 
thoroughly motivated, and I fail to really see such motivation. Are we 
really ready to say that a paradigmatic delusion like, for example, the 
Capgras delusion isn’t really a delusion? Surely what matters is not the 
individual, experiential evidence that the person has, but how their beliefs 
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and believing (assertions and behaviours) fit with our social epistemological 
landscape.3  
 
So, in contrast to Radden, I am tempted to say: “Yes, these patients still 
count as delusional”. This is for reasons related to the change of approach 
I am about to present. Notice that this is also in line with Maher’s implicit 
view. It certainly wasn’t his intention to show that these patients, who we 
previously had taken to be paradigm cases, were not, after all, “really” 
delusional. Rather, the question he is answering is: granting that they are 
delusional, how can we explain their delusional state? 
 
1.2.3. Murphy’s Clue: An Alternative Approach 
 
In a 2013 paper, Dominic Murphy doesn’t quite go as far as making the 
proposal that I am about to, but offers an important clue that leads to it. He 
writes: 
 
A delusion is a false belief, just as knowledge is true belief, but, 
as with knowledge, philosophers do not rest there. Knowledge 
is true belief plus something else. So too, philosophers try to 
find that extra property of the false belief that converts it from 
a mere false belief into a delusion. (Murphy 2013, 115, 
emphasis added) 
 
Putting aside the issue of delusions being accidentally true (since though 
truth is a way for a belief to be good, there are other ways in which it can 
be bad) this is to my mind a very important observation. It reminds me of 
something that Hartry Field wrote 15 years earlier in a wonderful paper 
presenting Epistemological Nonfactualism. He writes: 
 
Debates in epistemology […] often sound as if what is under 
discussion is the presence or absence of some mysterious 
justificatory fluid […]. Admittedly, one might reject the 
justificatory fluid picture and still regard epistemological 
debates as fully factual: one might say that the factual question 
is about which […] policies have such properties as reliability. 
 
3 In a very recent paper that is highly amenable to what I am saying here, Miyazono and 
Salice (2020) argue for the view that delusion should be seen through the lens of social 
epistemology, and, in particular, in terms of its relationship to what they call “social sources 
of evidence” rather than “individualistic sources of evidence”. Adopting a similar tactic, 
Cardella (this issue) examines the fascinating hypothesis that delusions do not centrally 
involve irrationality (construed individualistically), but rather deficits in social cognition or 
common sense. On the contrary, she argues, delusional individuals are by some measures 
more rational and better at reasoning logically than non-delusional individuals. 
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But this “naturalization move” obscures the fact that we are 
interested in which policies have factual properties like 
reliability only insofar as this bears on the practical question of 
which policies to employ. It is the practical question that is 
primary, and it is not itself a factual question. (Field 1998, 7) 
 
This criticism, levelled at epistemology in general, I think could equally be 
levelled at attempts to define delusion, too. And Field’s epistemological 
nonfactualism has inspired me to reflect on a similar position when 
thinking about delusion. To simplify somewhat, what Field is arguing is 
that, (i) you are going to struggle to find a descriptive, factual recipe that 
picks out all and only the things that count as epistemically good (e.g. 
“knowledge”), but even if you could (but you can’t) it misses the fact that 
the whole point of the epistemically good is about the practical question 
about what epistemic policies to employ. And the question “What policy 
should I employ?” just isn’t a factual question. Similarly, for delusion, the 




2. The Expressivist Proposal 
 
Nonfactualism and expressivism are closely associated, although they do 
not strictly entail one another. Nonfactualism is an ontological position, a 
claim about reality, about the world, concerning whether there are facts 
corresponding to certain domains of discourse. Expressivism, in contrast, 
is a claim about the nature of the discourse itself. It is possible to be a 
nonfactualist, but not an expressivist about a given domain (e.g. an error 
theorist or fictionalist), and conversely to be an expressivist, but a factualist 
(e.g. a quasi-realist). However, in the absence of certain facts, a popular 
way of accounting for a particular domain of discourse is to be an 
expressivist about that particular domain, namely, to claim that, although 
it looks like the domain is in the business of describing facts, it is actually 
doing something else (namely, “expressing” something in a sense that I 
will make clear shortly). 
 
2.1. What is Expressivism? 
 
Expressivism about a certain kind of discourse is a position concerning the 
meaning of that discourse, or, which perhaps (depending on one’s views 
of language) comes to the same thing, what we are doing when we are 
engaged in that discourse. Expressivists tend not to be expressivists about 
all kinds of discourse, so, expressivists about ethics are making a claim 
about ethical discourse, and usually distinguish that from other domains of 
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discourse, and, in particular, fact-stating discourse. “Grass is green” means 
what it does in virtue of the fact that it can be used to describe a fact, 
namely, the fact that grass is green. In terms of the psychological state of 
someone who uses that sentence, it is common to say that asserting 
sincerely (and without conceptual confusion) “Grass is green” is taken to 
express the belief that grass is green. Expressivists about ethical discourse 
who can agree that this picture is roughly correct, however will deny that 
it generalises to ethical discourse (see, e.g. Hare 1952). They will say that 
ethical sentences don’t describe facts, and that the psychological states of 
those who sincerely assert ethical sentences, namely those that are 
expressed by their assertions, are not factual beliefs but something else 
with various proposals, including emotions (Ayer 1952), desire-like 
prescriptions (Hare 1952), attitudes of being for (or against) (Gibbard 
1990; Schroeder 2008), impassioned beliefs (Ridge 2014), and so on. 
 
An important step towards understanding expressivism is to understand 
this notion of “expression”. What is expressed, in the sense relevant to 
understanding expressivism, is to be distinguished from what is said or 
articulated. Thus “Ouch!” is an expression of being in a state of pain, 
whereas the utterance “I am in pain” is an articulation of that state. 
Expressivism wants to think of moral claims as expressions in a way 
somewhat analogous to the way that “Ouch!” is an expression of pain. 
What a certain utterance expresses, in the relevant sense, is the mental state 
that it reveals that you have, not that it describes you as having. Note that 
fact-stating assertions express things too, but, unlike “Ouch!”, they express 
in virtue of describing. “The cat is black” is an articulation that the cat is 
black, but, if sincerely asserted, is an expression of my belief that the cat is 
black; stipulating sincerity on my part, it reveals that I have that belief. 
 
2.2. Two Kinds of Evaluation and Evaluative Discourse 
 
When we say that people are delusional, we are evaluating them 
negatively. Everyone will agree with this. However, it is vitally important 
to distinguish two different kinds of evaluations. One we might call 
descriptive evaluations. What you do when you descriptively evaluate is 
you describe a benchmark, and say that the thing in question is attaining or 
failing to attain said benchmark. For example, you might be selecting a 
basketball team, and have the policy that only players over 6ft2 will be 
considered. There’s a purely descriptive sense in which shorter players are 
deemed “inadequate”. The assertion that “this player is too short” need 
only (indeed will only) express factual belief (e.g. the belief that this player 
is 6ft1). In philosophy these benchmarks are everywhere, and they are 
theoretically rich and informed. For example, theorists in philosophy of 
biology will provide conditions for biological proper function. Traditional 
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epistemology (“naturalized” or otherwise), of the kind Field derides, does 
the same for knowledge. Don’t let the theoretical sophistication at play 
hide the fact that, like the basketball team selection, these evaluations are 
fact stating, descriptive. They describe a certain state of affairs and are true 
if and only if that state of affairs obtains. To put it another way, they are 
often taken to be unproblematically reducible to non-evaluative facts. In a 
sense, they aren’t really evaluations; they are descriptions. 
 
Some evaluations contrast with descriptive evaluations in being what we 
might call deeply evaluative. These evaluations are not about picking out 
a benchmark and stating that the thing in question either attains of fails to 
attain that benchmark. They are claims we make when we are evaluating 
as opposed to describing. This is most simply unpacked in terms of being 
in evaluative rather than descriptive mental states. Typical candidates of 
such deep evaluations are moral evaluations (right and wrong, good and 
evil). An expressivist about delusion attribution would take the attribution 
of delusion to be an evaluation in this deep and irreducible sense. This does 
not mean that calling someone delusional is negatively evaluating them 
morally (in fact, it often has quite the opposite effect). Rather, what moral 
discourse and delusion attribution have in common is that they are both 
evaluative in a way that doesn’t allow them to be analysed in factual, non-
evaluative terms.  
 
Expressivism takes the sincere claim “Murder is wrong” to express 
something other than a straightforward factual belief.4 The precise details 
of these are not what interest us now, but rather the view that there are 
kinds of claims, domains of discourse, that do not describe, that are not 
expressions of factual beliefs, but that do something else by expressing 
something else. This philosophical move, with regards to a certain kind of 
discourse, might be called the “basic expressivist move”. One of the nicest 
general articulations of this move was made by Sellars (who was writing 
too early to have ever called himself an expressivist): 
 
 
4 At this point, a vital point of clarification is needed, related to this stipulation of sincerity. 
The “meaning” of the word, in the relevant sense, is preserved whether or not the speaker 
actually is in the relevant mental state. Even less is the meaning straightforwardly derived 
from the speaker’s mental state. Language is a public and socially distributed affair. Rather, 
the meaning of the word, on the expressivists account, is derived from the mental state that 
the word has the function of expressing. There’s nothing odd about this. It applies quite 
naturally to other uses of language. An assertion still does what it does, and means what it 
means, if I don’t believe or otherwise endorse its content. But we understand what the 
assertion “The cat is black” means because its default function is to express the belief that 
the cat is black. Indeed, lying works precisely because it exploits this function. 
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[O]nce the tautology ‘The world is described by descriptive 
concepts’ is freed from the idea that the business of all non-
logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an 
ungrudging recognition that many expressions which 
empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in 
discourse are not inferior, just different. (Sellars 1957, 282)    
 
My central suggestion is that “delusion” is not (or at least not primarily) in 
the business of describing. But it is not thereby inferior, just different. 
 
2.3. Why be an Expressivist about Delusion Attribution? 
 
Many of the considerations that motivate expressivism about ethics apply 
to delusion. These are: 
 
1. Ontological reluctance 
2. Intrinsic pragmatism 
3. Deep disagreement 
 
I’ll go through these quite quickly, in turn, since I think that what is really 
interesting lies beyond this. 
 
What I’m calling “ontological reluctance” is sometimes called (in 
Mackie’s rather dated terminology) the “argument from queerness”, 
although I take it to be broader and more general. Some theorists are 
generally reluctant to posit a strange (“queer”, namely, “of a very strange 
sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe” (Mackie 1977, 
38)) realm of moral properties or facts. But more generally, regardless of 
what we are calling these things (properties, facts etc.) there can also be a 
general reluctance to engage in ontology in the classical sense (e.g. social 
ontology being exempt) at all, when we can account for the phenomenon 
in question without any mysteries outstanding. Within the context of this 
ontological reluctance, expressivists about ethical discourse feel a certain 
calm when they reflect on the fact that social creatures like ourselves will 
have sought to regulate behaviour in a pro-social way by expressing 
(revealing) to conspecifics their disapproval, and thereby motivating the 
community at large to reward and punish so as to secure adherence to social 
norms (morality, politeness etc.). Similarly, the argument would go, there 
are no sui generis delusion-pertaining (or indeed, knowledge-pertaining) 
facts or properties. Social creatures like us who communicate and try to 
live in groups, are going to give rough-and-ready seals of approval (thumbs 
up) to good epistemic states and practices, and give thumbs down to poor 
ones. The fact that the words “knowledge” and “delusion” emerged in 
English, and became roughly regimented, is just a distraction. 
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This relates to the second consideration. Moral discourse is intrinsically 
motivating. There is a certain contradiction to sincerely claiming “Murder 
is wrong” while not thereby feeling motivated in certain ways, e.g. a ceteris 
paribus reluctance to murder, encourage others not to murder, etc. 
Similarly, delusion discourse seems intrinsically motivating: it would be 
inconsistent to regard someone as delusional, and yet have no inclination 
to refrain from taking what they are saying seriously, no inclination to not 
argue against them, and so on. Of course, these inclinations are multi-track 
and dispositional. You don’t have to act in accordance with them, and they 
don’t have to be exhaustively listed. The evaluative state is not simply the 
aggregate of these motivations, rather the motivations fall out of the 
evaluative state. 
 
Finally, there is the consideration behind deep disagreement. In these 
instances, all of the facts pertaining to a particular case are agreed by two 
individuals, and yet there is still disagreement about where something is 
morally wrong. There is no further fact that can be learnt in order to bring 
the two disagreeing subjects in line with one another. Therefore, it is not a 
disagreement about facts, but about something else. Of course, on many 
very serious moral infringements (murder), unanimity is not hard to find, 
but for more contentious culturally specific “beliefs” (sex before marriage, 
homosexuality, abortion etc.) these deep disagreements are rife. A similar 
thing could be said for delusion. There are not only disagreements about 
what counts as good/bad, acceptable/unacceptable belief contents; there 
are also disagreements about what counts as good methods and procedures 
for forming beliefs. Murphy (2013) presents this example in a paper that 
very much follows the spirit, if not to the letter, of what I am saying here. 
 
Boyer, (2001, 69-70) reporting fieldwork done by Wendy 
James in the Sudan, discusses ebony trees that are believed to 
be a source of social information. The trees record 
conversations, and are privy to the plans of witches. You can 
learn what they know by burning an ebony twig, dipping it in 
water and reading the pattern of ashes in the water. A belief in 
cognitive interaction with ebony trees counts as culturally 
normal, and hence not delusional or otherwise suspect. 
(Murphy 2013, 22) 
 
This final “delusional or otherwise suspect” is very much in keeping with 
the picture I’m presenting. To call something delusional is to express your 
folk-epistemic disapproval, to flag it as suspect. Aside from these 
theoretical considerations, there is a far more intuitive consideration one 
can appeal to: it just seems right. Just consider something you might 
overhear in public between two friends: “You’re delusional if you think 
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that Manchester United can qualify for the Champions League!” You’ll 
grant me that this seems like an expressive rather than descriptive use of 
language. But is this a particularly exotic and non-standard use of the 
word? Is this making expressive use of a linguistic tool that is originally 
purely descriptive? Or is it a hyperbolic use of a linguistic tool that is 
already to some extent expressive? I would be tempted to say the latter. 
Just because the word “delusional” is being uttered calmly by someone in 
a white lab-coat holding a thick book, doesn’t make it any less expressive 
in its semantics. (Recall that the speaker does not have to be in the 
emotional state canonically expressed by the word, any more than I have 
to believe every single descriptive assertion that I utter.) 
 
2.4. The Consequences of Expressivism about Delusion Attribution 
 
The consequences of expressivism serve to lend further support to it. In a 
sense, we can adopt expressivism as an inference to the best explanation, 
since some of its consequences align with what we already observe. 
 
2.4.1. Inability to Define is to be Expected 
 
The inability to define delusion is not only to be expected, but embraced. 
If delusion talk expresses (reveals) our reactive folk epistemological 
attitudes, then we would certainly not expect these attitudes to track 
consistent parametric properties that can be captured by necessary and 
sufficient conditions. These are not going to survive the scrutiny of 
counterexamples. But, again, where do the counterexamples come from in 
the first place? I’d say, our reactive folk epistemological attitudes. The 
definitions don’t function to tell us what’s delusional: we have a sense of 
that already. Similar things of course can be said of our sense of right and 
wrong. And, again, we would expect all sorts of things to interfere with 
any clear, factual, theoretically informed judgment of delusion. Culture, 
motivation, even the way in which the case is presented, may influence the 
extent to which someone deems a belief (or assertion) to be bad. This 
relates to the second consequence. 
 
2.4.2. Disjunctive Norm Pluralism 
 
There are many different ways in which a belief (and related phenomena, 
like inquiry, reasoning, etc.) can be good or bad. Two obvious ways are 
the process-independent dimension of truth and falsehood, and the process-
dependent dimension of rationality. Both of these contribute to the 
“badness” of the belief, and all that matters is that there is enough folk-
detectable badness. It doesn’t matter where it comes from. Take reverse 
Othello delusion. The belief content that the subject’s wife is not cheating 
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on him is a perfectly plausible content taken in isolation. It is true (one 
hopes) of hundreds of thousands of people around the world. What makes 
it delusional is the subject’s baffling blindness in the face of 
counterevidence. On the other end of the spectrum, it matters little what 
evidence a delusional patient might cite for the claim “I am the left foot of 
God.” We just don’t see how that could possibly be true. There are likely 
many other epistemic norms that we detect (e.g. cognitive flexibility, 
relevance detection etc.) and they may all be involved in tipping the 
balance toward the (folk-epistemically) bad or good. Since it doesn’t 
matter on what types of grounds the belief is deemed to be bad, we have 
what we might call disjunctive norm pluralism when it comes to something 
being delusional or not.  
 
A related point concerns “understandability”. Like we saw in the case of 
the mother in an understandable level of denial about her son’s guilt, a sort 
of pluralistic criterion of understandability tracks our delusion attributions 
better than something like rationality. Interestingly, Jaspers is often quoted 
as saying that delusions are “un-understandable”, and this is often 
interpreted as meaning that they cannot be theoretically understood. 
Whether or not this is the correct interpretation, there is an interpretation 
of this claim according to which it approximates an accurate claim. That 
is, if we think of all of the different folk-epistemic norms as constituting 
this rough criterion of “understandability”, which is basically about 
whether somebody adheres to our predictive models of how humans should 
behave (i.e. they should be resistant to evidence that casts their loves ones 
in a very bad light, up to a certain point). Calling something delusional is 
to say: “Wow, this person is flying in the face of the models I use to make 
sense of people!” 
 
 
3. Delusion and Pathology Revisited 
 
We examined the idea that delusion and pathology should not be 
conceptually tied to one another. However, suppose that we are 
expressivists about delusion attribution. What does that say about the 
relationship between delusion and pathology? There are a number of 
options, depending on how we think of pathology. 
 
One way to go is to think that, whereas delusion is a folk concept that is 
deeply evaluative, pathology is a theoretical notion (or at least should be 
(see Boorse 1975)). Then that theoretical notion is to be thought of in 
objective and fact-stating terms. This would grant total conceptual 
independence between delusion and pathology. It might turn out that many 
of the things that we deem to be delusional are the results of things that, 
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according to this factual, theoretical notion, are also pathological. To take 
an imperfect, but still helpful, analogy: I might dislike the taste of 
tomatoes. A chemist might be able to isolate the exact compound in the 
tomato that arouses my dislike. The claim that tomatoes contain that 
compound is a factual claim, my assertion “tomatoes are yucky” is not 
(note, though, the claim that “SW dislikes tomatoes” is clearly factual – 
just like claims about whether an individual attributes delusion is factual 
although the attribution itself is not).  
 
A closely related view would have a hybrid approach to pathology, e.g. 
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction account, where the factual component of 
dysfunction is necessary but not sufficient: the value-laden notion of harm 
is needed in addition. This means, similarly, that some of the things that 
we deem to be delusional are pathological. Note that not only is this 
consistent with Miyazono’s paper, his task is to use Wakefield to tell us 
why the things we deem to be delusions that are pathological count as 
pathological. He is, in a way that is very much in the spirit of what I am 
saying here, not interested in delineating the realm of the delusional. 
 
Finally, we could be non-factualists about pathology too, for similar 
reasons to those motivating expressivism about delusion attribution 
(although I’d be tempted like Boorse to distinguish disease from illness, 
where the latter may warrant non-factualism, but the former notion could 
sensibly be introduced as a factual notion). Then there is a further 
bifurcation. We should first establish whether the reactive dispositions that 
underpin our delusion attributions and those that underpin our attributions 
of illness (or perhaps specifically mental illness) embody norms that are 
the same, or similar, or completely different. In other words, we need to 
ask: What is the relationship between our folk-epistemology and our folk-
psychiatry, as embodied in our reactive dispositions? The sorts of 
conditions under which someone (perhaps specifically “a Westerner”) 
might call someone “delusional”, “crazy” or “unwell”, might well overlap 
substantially, but not entirely. In short, we might revert to a very close 
connection between delusion and pathology, but one that looks very 
different to the presumed factualist orthodoxy. Indeed, we might even 
revert back to a simple “definition” of delusion as “pathological belief”. 
This is not to be unpacked as a factualist, theoretically-informed, 
definition, but rather as a way of flagging that our multi-track sensibilities 
deem belief to be pathological in the simple folk sense that it can’t be 
“understood”, is weird, alien, flies in the face of how human beings ought 








First I’d like to clarify that my proposal is incomplete in that, although it 
claims that delusion attribution does not describe and does not function to 
express factual belief, I have not given a clear positive account of what it 
does instead, and what it does express. This would have to be left for 
another day, but I would suggest that it would be consistent with our folk-
epistemic practices in general, and that these more approximately track 
social epistemic rather than individual epistemic norms (Miyazono and 
Salice 2020). As for what is expressed by delusion-talk, my hunch is that 
this is not going to be something individual like a mental state, but 
something socially distributed. For want of better terminology, what I have 
in mind is something like “flagging as suspect”, or “enjoining to action”. 
In short, it’s about the role it plays in a community, more than the mental 
state that the individual is in. 
 
Although, theoretically, my central proposal here might seem radical, in 
practical terms it is not requiring much revision to existing work. Indeed, 
much of the philosophical work on delusion glosses over strict definitions 
of delusion, or, at best, provides working or rough definitions, backed up 
by canonical examples. Then, philosophers focus on the canonical cases 
themselves asking questions like: “Are they really beliefs?”, “What makes 
them pathological?”, “On what grounds might the delusional judgements 
be made?” What I suggest here has no direct bearing on these questions, 
for they deal with the phenomena themselves, as already picked out. What 
I’m talking about here is how the picking out itself seems to work. My 
suggestion is that, not only is it untidy: it is not even descriptive.  
 
There is, however, some impact of what I’m saying on this work (aside that 
some may find it interesting). It might be that there is an expectation that 
delusion could be cleanly defined; it just hasn’t been achieved yet. And the 
take-home message here is that this would be a mistake, and we should rest 
comfortable in the understanding of the kind of term that “delusion” really 
is. In a related manner, a lot of philosophical work on delusion lacks clear 
quantification. You see questions like: “Are delusions beliefs?”, “Are 
delusions irrational?”, “What makes delusions pathological?”, “Are 
delusions harmful malfunctioning beliefs?” A logician presented with 
these questions would ask: All delusions? And if so, is it by definition or 
contingently the case? My proposal makes explicit what remains largely 
implicit: that these questions deal with the paradigms, not the parameters, 
of delusion. 
 
Finally, what I am suggesting here in no way undermines careful 
psychiatric taxonomy, and diagnostic clinical practice. In fact, it siphons 
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off the question of whether something is a delusion or not as something 
that is not of theoretical relevance. In a modification of G. E. Moore’s 
Open Question Argument (Moore 1903), you can describe any condition 
in the greatest detail, and someone could still without inconsistency or 
ignorance ask, “Yes, I understand this condition, but is it delusional?” 
Establishing delusion-status is not a scientific or theoretical enterprise, and 
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